Method and device for preventing a control error of a machine tool

ABSTRACT

Machine tool ( 2, 2   a ) protected against improper activation, which has an open-loop and/or dosed-loop control device for the activation of machine functions, preferably machine axes, and means for reading in machine control parameters for the open-loop and/or closed-loop control device from a data carrier or electronic carrier signal ( 3 ), and which has an improper-activation safety module, preferably an improper-activation safety software module, which decodes the machine control parameters that are intended for the machine tool and are encoded by means of an asymmetric encryption method, using an encryption key which is assigned to the machine tool ( 2, 2   a ) and provided for the encryption, with the aid of a decryption key which is likewise assigned to the machine tool ( 2, 2   a ), is different from the encryption key and is provided for the decryption, and which module enables the machine control parameters for controlling the machine tool ( 2, 2   a ) only in the case of successful decryption, with an associated method of avoiding improper machine activation by machine control parameters, and also an associated data carrier or data carrier signal and a method, system and program for generating such parameters.

The present invention relates to a machine tool protected againstimproper activation and an associated method of avoiding impropermachine activation by machine control parameters.

Against the background of increasingly interlinked production processesand their standardization in the industry, the problem that is nowadaysthe prime concern in the production of machine tools is that of alsoincorporating in this process the computer systems that are necessaryfor activating the machine tools. In this respect, one aim is toprovide, to the extent technically possible, standardized machinecontrol systems, offering the user greatest possible uniformity of themachine control parameters for the products from his range ofworkpieces—for instance when changing an actual machine type or else forimproved data storage and archiving.

Such initiatives have already been pursued for some time for varioustypes of machine tool.

For bevel gear cutting machines there are for instance solutions to thisin which the relevant machine control parameters of an entire machinefamily are combined in a standardized data model with all the axes to beactivated that come into consideration in the machine family, whichthen, in individual cases, is replicated on the respective machineactually concerned

-   -   to the extent to which this is possible, that is to say the axes        activated by the machine control parameters are also actually        present.

One problem of these systems is, however, that the standard data modelcreated by them for the machine control parameters also entails greatrisks for the operational reliability of the machine tools respectivelyactivated with them. While in the case of a non-standard data modelthere is no risk of using the machine control parameters to activate amachine type which is not suitable for these parameters, because itcannot even read the corresponding format, or at least not process it,this is no longer ruled out in the case of the standardization mentionedabove. Rather, here it is the case that all the machine types can readin the machine control parameters in their standard format and alsoprocess them for their control; however, here it is not ensured thatthis processing then always leads to an appropriate working result onthe machine. Indeed, more troubling still, it is still possible formachine control parameters which have been generated for one machinetype 1 to be incorrectly sent to a machine of type 2, which thenprocesses them and thereby controls its axes in such a way as to causeirreparable damage to the machine itself or even personal injury, forinstance as a result of electric cables being severed by cutting toolsimproperly controlled in this way.

Such improper activation can be avoided for instance by adding to themachine control parameters a machine address, which specifies themachine that can be activated with the aid of the machine controlparameters, and by setting up the machines in such a way that they firstcheck from this added machine address whether the machine controlparameters are also actually suitable for them. Such a procedurepresupposes, however, that the machine control parameters protected inthis way are also actually in an unchanged form when they reach themachine from the source from which they originate. This cannot always beensured, however. Rather, it is the case that, once generated,parameters of this type are easy to change. For instance, it is possiblethat machine control parameters are generated for a specific workpieceand a specific machine, but this machine is not available at the plannedproduction time. If another machine is provided instead, one which iscapable in principle of processing the machine-independent format of themachine control parameters, but for different limit values and underdifferent boundary conditions in terms of safety than those which applyto the machine originally planned for use, there is a great temptationsimply to use the machine control parameters for this machine althoughthey are not enabled for it, in that, instead of the original machineaddress of the machine that is not available, now the address of theother machine, which although available for these control parameters hasnot been enabled, is entered—for instance by means of an editor.

Experience shows that, in today's production plants, which are understrong pressure to produce results, such a procedure breaching safetyfunctions is not uncommon.

It is therefore the object of the present invention to provide a machinetool which is protected against improper activation and associatedmethods of avoiding improper machine activation by machine controlparameters which ensure to the greatest extent possible that controlparameters once generated for a specific machine are also only used foractivating this machine.

This object is achieved according to the invention by a machine toolprotected against improper activation which has an open-loop and/orclosed-loop control device for the activation of machine functions,preferably machine axes, and means for reading in machine controlparameters for the open-loop and/or closed-loop control device from adata carrier or electronic carrier signal, which is characterized inthat it has an improper-activation safety module, preferably animproper-activation safety software module, which decodes the machinecontrol parameters again that are intended for the machine tool and areencoded by means of an asymmetric encryption method, using an encryptionkey which is assigned to the machine tool and provided for theencryption, with the aid of a decryption key which is likewise assignedto the machine tool, is different from the encryption key and isprovided for the decryption, and which module enables the machinecontrol parameters for controlling the machine tool only in the case ofsuccessful decryption.

Also helping to achieve this object is a data carrier according to theinvention or an electronic carrier signal with machine controlparameters for reading into the machine tool, the data carrier or theelectronic carrier signal having on it machine control parameters forthe machine tool which are encoded by means of an asymmetric encryptionmethod with the aid of an encryption key which is assigned to themachine tool and is provided for the encryption, so that the machinetool can decode them again with the aid of a decryption key which islikewise assigned to it, is different from the encryption key and isprovided for the decryption, and the data carrier or the electroniccarrier signal controls the machine tool by means of these machinecontrol parameters during reading-in or after reading-in after they havebeen decoded.

Similarly helping to achieve the object according to the invention is amethod of avoiding improper machine activation by machine controlparameters of a machine tool in which the machine control parametersintended for the machine tool are encoded by means of an asymmetricencryption method with the aid of an encryption key which is assigned tothe machine tool and is provided for the encryption, so that the machinetool can decode the machine control parameters again with the aid of adecryption key which is likewise assigned to it, is different from theencryption key and is provided for the decryption.

The aforementioned machine tool according to the invention, the datacarrier or carrier signal according to the invention with machinecontrol parameters for reading into the machine tool and also theassociated method according to the invention of avoiding impropermachine activation by machine control parameters now achieve the effectthat only the machine for which the machine control parameters weregenerated is activated, in that only this machine is capable in thefirst place of decrypting the data intended for it and encoded with anencryption key assigned to it, and then subsequently processing the saiddata. For this purpose, a method already known from the prior art (forinstance from Bauer, Friedrich L., Entzifferte Geheimnisse—Methoden undMaximen der Kryptologie [deciphered secrets—methods and maxims ofcryptology], Berlin Heidelberg 1995, pages 153-168, or Diffie, W. andHellman, M. E., New Directions in Cryptography, Transactions IEEEInform. Theory, IT-22, 6 (1976), 644-654 or else U.S. Pat. No.4,405,829, all texts of which the disclosure content is expresslyincorporated here by way of reference), namely a so-called asymmetricencryption method, is used—although here in an extremely unusual way—inwhich a message for a recipient is encoded by means of an encryption key(also referred to in the literature as a public key), which message canthen be decoded again by the said recipient by means of a decryption keywhich is different from the public key and in the literature is alsoreferred to as a so-called private key. According to the presentinvention, this method is used, however, in such a way that theencryption key does not serve for encoding, i.e. making a messageunreadable, but rather for the secure addressing of the correctrecipient. In other words, the encryption key acts here both as asecurity mechanism against unauthorized manipulations of the machinecontrol parameters encrypted with it and also inherently, by way of theasymmetric encryption method used, as a machine address of theassociated machine tool. By contrast with the object of an asymmetricencryption method according to the prior art, here it is not the aim tokeep the machine control parameters secret in some way, but only to makecertain that the parameters are only used to activate the machine thatcan also ensure operationally reliable execution of these controlinstructions. This is also reflected in the use of the encryption anddecryption keys. This is so because in the present invention it isprecisely the encryption key, referred to in the prior art as public(known as the ‘public key’, see above), that is the actual ‘secret’ key,i.e. known only to the authorized system for the generation of machinecontrol parameters; without knowledge of this encryption key, a machinecannot be activated by means of generated machine control parameters.Conversely, the decryption key referred to in the prior art as the‘private key’ does not necessarily have to be kept secret according tothe present invention. Rather, it can be used publicly, for instance formaking the communication traffic between a computer system forgenerating the machine control parameters and the respective machinestransparent, without the aim pursued by the invention of operationallyreliable machine activation being put at risk as a result.

If, however, other considerations make it desirable for the decryptionkey of the machine tool also to be kept secret, it is recommendable touse an embodiment of the machine tool according to the invention inwhich the latter has a reader, preferably a chip card reader, which isintended for receiving a decryption module, preferably a chip card,which has the decryption key, with the aid of which theimproper-activation safety module decodes the encoded machine controlparameters, and the decryption module being set up in such a way thatonly the improper-activation safety module can read out the decryptionkey from the module, which can easily be achieved for instance by thedata that are located in the module, that is also the decryption keyitself, in turn being encoded, the improper-activation safety modulehaving the key for the decryption of the module data.

The determination whether a decryption was successful can preferablyhappen by taking place after the decryption on the basis of finding amachine identification assigned to the machine tool, the associatedmethod according to the invention of avoiding improper machineactivation by machine control parameters of a machine tool according tothe present invention being designed in such a way that a machineidentification assigned to the machine is added to the machine controlparameters before the encryption, so that, when it decodes the machinecontrol parameters again with the aid of its assigned private decryptionkey, the machine tool can determine on the basis of the fact that thesecontain the machine identification assigned to it that the parametersconcerned are machine control data for its activation. The correspondingdata carrier or the corresponding electronic carrier signal with machinecontrol parameters for reading into the machine tool is in this casedesigned in such a way that on the data carrier or the electroniccarrier signal there is at least one machine identification included inthe encryption and assigned to the machine tool, so that, when itdecodes the machine control parameters again with the aid of itsassigned private decryption key, the machine tool can determine on thebasis of the fact that these contain the machine identification assignedto it that the parameters concerned are machine control data for itsactivation.

In a particularly preferred embodiment, the machine tool according tothe invention, protected against improper activation, is characterizedin that the improper-activation safety module enables various functionsof the machine tool for control by the machine control parameters independence on the decryption key originating from a plurality ofdecryption keys assigned to the machine tool.

Nowadays it is often the case that, in respect of its physical componentparts, one and the same machine is offered on the market in variantswhich differ both in price and in function. The individual variantsthereby often differ only in different control modules, preferablysoftware modules, or even only in the different enablement by themanufacturer of different (software) modules already present in themachine, according to which options the customer is prepared to pay for.The present~invention is ideally suited in the embodiment describedabove for also ensuring this functionality largely with security withrespect to manipulations, in that modules, preferably software modules,with a differing functional extent are stored in the machine and arerespectively assigned different encryption and decryption keys. Thecustomer acquiring a specific machine variant is then also alwayssupplied at the same time with the encryption key—coded openly, or ifdesired also in a concealed manner (for instance a chip card as statedabove)—, which serves as an inherent machine address of the modulecorresponding to the extent of performance he has ordered. The machinecontrol parameters encoded by means of this encryption key can then onlybe decrypted and further processed by this module. All other modules, onthe other hand, cannot do anything with the parameters. In practice,this can be realized for instance by all the modules attempting oneafter the other to decrypt the machine control parameters until finallyone (or even none) is successful, it also being possible for thisprocedure to be optimized by always beginning with the module that waslast successful in decryption in all further attempts at decryption, sothat processing time is saved as a result, and a new module is soughtonly in the case of changing the encryption key, serving as it were inthis way as an address of a virtual machine—for instance in the event ofa so-called upgrade. In this connection, it is to be emphasized that thepresent invention is particularly suitable for upgrades of this type, inthat in such a case the customer wishing to acquire new options for hismachine is simply correspondingly provided with new decryption orencryption modules, preferably chip cards, which represents a solutionwhich is decidedly secure with respect to manipulations andcost-effective.

A further preferred embodiment of a machine tool according to theinvention, protected against improper activation, is distinguished bythe fact that the improper-activation safety module determinessuccessful decryption of the machine control parameters after decryptionalso on the basis of finding a signature of a unit authorized foractivating the machine tool.

The associated method of avoiding improper machine activation by machinecontrol parameters of a machine tool according to the present inventionis characterized in that the machine control parameters intended for themachine tool are first encoded by means of a private decryption key,assigned to the sender of the machine control parameters, and areprovided with a sender identification of this sender, and, signed by thesender in this way, are only encoded with the aid of the encryption keythat is assigned to the machine tool and known for the encryption.

Signature methods are methods which serve for the authentication of amessage with regard to it sender. Asymmetric encoding methods can alsobe used as signature methods whenever the message can be both decodedwith the decryption key when it has been encoded with the encryption keyand decoded with the encryption key when it has been encoded with thedecryption key (cf. also in this respect for instance the texts alreadyincorporated here in the disclosure content by reference, for instancefrom Bauer, Friedrich L., Entzifferte Geheimnisse—Methoden und Maximender Kryptologie, Berlin Heidelberg 1995, pages 153-168, in particularpages 155 and 156 therein, or else U.S. Pat. No. 4,405,829). In such asignature method with an encryption key and a decryption key of thesender, the latter can then sign a message in a way which can easily bechecked, in that the sender initially encodes the message with hisdecryption key, then adds a sender identification to this key andencodes the overall message created in this way with the encryption keybelonging to the target machine. After decoding, this machine can theninitially read the sender identification and determine by means ofthis—for instance on the basis of a directory, such as a list or a databank—, which encryption key is assigned to this sender identification.If then—on the basis of the special additional characteristic of thisasymmetric encoding system explained at the beginning of thissection—this encryption key found in this way is suitable for thedecryption of the message, the machine knows that the message actuallycomes from the sender corresponding to the identification used in theoverall message.

In the present case, such a signature method that is already known fromthe prior art can thus be additionally used not only for checking on themachine tool whether the machine control parameters were actuallygenerated for this machine, but also for determining whether the systemwhich generated the data—that is the sender in the terminology usedabove—is also actually suitable and authorized to do so, for instance onthe basis of a corresponding list. If this is not the case, in thisembodiment the machine does not process the corresponding machinecontrol parameters. Such an embodiment consequently offers thepossibility of certifying systems for the generation of machine controlparameters and enabling them for the activation of machine tools. Inthis way it is possible to prevent for instance that those systems whichdo not offer sufficient assurance for the security of the often highlycomplex activation of the machine with its axes are excluded from theactivation of the machines.

Also serving here for the operation of the machine tool according to theinvention is preferably a data carrier according to the invention or anelectronic carrier signal according to the invention with machinecontrol parameters for reading into the machine tool, the data carrieror the electronic carrier signal having on it machine control parametersfor the machine tool which are first encoded by means of a privateencryption key, assigned to the sender of the machine controlparameters, and are provided with a sender identification of thissender, and, signed in this way, are only encoded with the aid of theencryption key that is assigned to the machine tool and known for theencryption.

Also serving for carrying out the present invention is a method ofgenerating machine control parameters for a machine tool which ischaracterized according to the invention in that it generates a datacarrier or an electronic carrier signal with machine control parametersas described above. It goes without saying that this method may also tobe realized on a computer system with at least one data processing unitand at least one memory, usually for instance as a computer program, ithaving the corresponding instructions set up for carrying out themethod. Such a computer program may in this case take any form, but inparticular also that of a computer program product on acomputer-readable medium, such as for instance a floppy disc, CD or DVD,it having computer program coding means, with which, after loading thecomputer program, a computer is in each case made by the program tocarry out the method of generating a data carrier or electronic carriersignal according to the invention. It may, however, also be for instancein the form of a computer program product which has a computer programon an electronic carrier signal, with which, after loading the computerprogram, a computer is in each case made by the program to carry out themethod according to the invention.

In the same way as described above, the method according to theinvention may be used to avoid improper machine activation by machinecontrol parameters of a machine tool in all embodiments on acorrespondingly set up computer system. It may take the form of acomputer program, for instance on a data carrier or an electroniccarrier signal, for instance for downloading. A computer system set upin this way for generating machine control parameters for a machine toolaccording to the invention may in this case also have a reader,preferably a chip card reader, which is intended for receiving anencryption module, preferably a chip card, which has the encryption key,with the aid of which the computer system encodes the machine controlparameters, and furthermore an encoding module, preferably an encodingsoftware module, is provided for encoding the machine controlparameters, the encryption module being set up in such a way that onlythe encoding module can read out the encryption key from the module. Itshould be additionally noted at this point that of course all otherfurther data necessary for the present invention can be storedcompletely or partly on a module allowing reading out, for instance thedecryption module or the encryption module, preferably in such a waythat they are secured against unauthorized reading out. All theseembodiments which use such modules, preferably chip cards, offer theadvantage that they can be configured extremely flexibly with the aid ofan external system, without requiring any modification of the softwarein the respective machine tool or the respective computer system forgenerating the control parameters.

The different individual elements of the present invention describedabove, seen in their entirety, can provide a computer control system foravoiding improper machine activation by machine control parameters for amachine tool with

-   -   a computer system for generating machine control parameters for        a machine tool according to the invention or    -   a computer program or computer program product for this, and    -   at least one machine tool according to the invention.

Further details of such a system according to the present invention canbe taken from the exemplary embodiments.

Exemplary embodiments of the present invention, which are to beunderstood as non-restrictive, are discussed below on the basis of thedrawing, in which:

FIG. 1 shows a computer control system according to the invention foravoiding improper machine activation by machine control parameters for amachine tool.

FIG. 1 shows a computer control system according to the invention foravoiding improper machine activation by machine control parameters for amachine tool, to be precise with a computer system 1 according to theinvention for generating machine control parameters for a machine tool2, 2 a according to the invention with at least one data processing unitand at least one memory, the data processing unit being set up inprogramming terms in such a way that it generates here in a data networkan electronic carrier signal 3 with machine control parameters accordingto the present invention, and two machine tools 2, 2 a according to theinvention.

In the present case, the situation is therefore such that the firstmachine 2 has (along with other axes) a mechanical pivoting axis σ₁ forthe pivoting of the workpiece and the grinding wheel with respect toeach other by means of a rotation of the grinding wheel axis or itsparallel projection in the horizontal plane A. The second machine 2 alikewise has such a pivoting axis σ₂, but, on account of furthermechanical components in the pivoting range of this axis, cannot coverthe complete pivoting angle of the pivoting axis σ₁, even though thissecond machine 2 a can in principle, on account of the same basicconstruction, in fact still activate the pivoting axis of an entireangular range, which from a certain position, however, then leads tobreakage. The present invention now offers the possibility ofeffectively preventing operation involving such breakage. The machine 2with the greater pivoting angle has an improper-activation safetysoftware module_(M2), with associated encryption key_(M2) and decryptionkey_(M2). The second machine 2 a with the smaller pivoting anglecontains its own improper-activation safety software module_(M2a), withassociated encryption key_(M2a) and decryption key_(M2a). The computersystem 1, which generates the machine control parameters, then knowswhich maximum angle is available for activation to the respectivemachine 2, 2 a for the mechanical pivoting axis σ₁, σ₂. In order thatmachine control parameters for the first machine 2 are then notmistakenly used on the other machine 2 a, they are encrypted by means ofan encryption module C, preferably a software module, by means of therespective encryption key, namely the encryption key_(M2) or else theencryption key_(M2a), as the respective inherent address of theassociated machine, this key being read in from a chip card 4 by meansof a corresponding reader. In this way it is thus ensured that only themachine 2, 2 a addressed by means of this key is also actually activatedby the machine control parameters, and so breakage does not occur, sincethe respective machine 2, 2 a can also only read the control parametersaddressed to it by means of their respective improper-activation safetysoftware module and the decryption key read in from their own chip card4 a, 4 b by means of a reader.

In order that the respective machine 2, 2 a can also make certain thatthe control parameters also actually originate from a source which iscapable of ensuring reliable activation of the machine 2, 2 a, here themachine control parameters are also signed by means of a signaturemethod using a sender identification. With the aid of an encryption keyand a decryption key of the sender, namely with the aid of the keysencryption key_(comp1) and decryption key_(comp1), the machine controlparameters can be signed by the computer system 1 in a way which caneasily be checked, in that it, as the sender, initially encodes thecontrol parameters with its decryption key_(comp1), then adds the senderidentification to this key and encodes the overall message created inthis way with the encryption key_(M2) or encryption key_(M2a) belongingto the target machine 2, 2 a. After decoding, the respective machine 2,2 a can then initially read the sender identification, here senderidentification_(comp1), and determine by means of this—here on the basisof a directory on the chip card 4 a, 4 b—, which encryption key isassigned to this sender identification, here encryption key_(comp1). Ifthen, on the basis of the special additional characteristic of thisasymmetric encoding system that is required and used here in the generalpart of the description (as for instance in the case of the known RSAmethod, cf. also U.S. Pat. No. 4,405,829), this encryption key found inthis way is suitable for the decryption of the message, because it wasencrypted by means of the decryption key, the machine 2, 2 a knows thatthe message actually comes from the computer system 1 as the sendercorresponding to the identification used in the overall message, senderidentification_(comp1). The fact that this identification is recorded onthe chip card 4 a, 4 b allows the machine to rely on the suitability ofthe sender for activation.

1. Machine tool (2, 2 a) protected against improper activation,comprising. an open-loop and/or dosed-loop control device for theactivation of machine functions, preferably machine axes (σ₁, σ₂), meansfor reading in machine control parameters for the open-loop and/ordosed-loop control device from a data carrier or electronic carriersignal (3), an improper-activation safety module, preferably animproper-activation safety software module, which decodes the machinecontrol parameters again that are intended for the machine tool and areencoded by means of an asymmetric encryption method, using an encryptionkey which is assigned to the machine tool (2, 2 a) and provided for theencryption, with the aid of a decryption key which is likewise assignedto the machine tool (2, 2 a), is different from the encryption key andis provided for the decryption, and which module enables the machinecontrol parameters for controlling the machine tool (2, 2 a) only in thecase of successful decryption.
 2. Machine tool (2, 2 a) protectedagainst improper activation according to claim 1, characterized in thatthe machine tool has a reading module, preferably a chip card reader,which is intended for receiving a decryption module, preferably a chipcard, which has the decryption key, with the aid of which theimproper-activation safety module decodes the encoded machine controlparameters, and the decryption module is set up in such a way that onlythe improper-activation safety module can read out the decryption keyfrom the module.
 3. Machine tool (2, 2 a) protected against improperactivation according to claim 1, characterized in that theimproper-activation safety module determines the successful decryptionof the machine control parameters after the decryption on the basis offinding a machine identification assigned to the machine tool (2, 2 a).4. Machine tool (2, 2 a) protected against improper activation accordingto claim 1, characterized in that the improper-activation safety moduleenables various functions of the machine tool (2, 2 a) for control bythe machine control parameters in dependence on the decryption keyoriginating from a plurality of decryption keys assigned to the machinetool (2, 2 a).
 5. Machine tool (2, 2 a) protected against improperactivation according to claim 1, characterized in that theimproper-activation safety module determines the successful decryptionof the machine control parameters after decryption also on the basis offinding a signature of a unit authorized for activating the machine tool(2, 2 a).
 6. Machine tool (2, 2 a) protected against improper activationaccording to claim 5, characterized in that the improper-activationsafety module enables various functions of the machine tool (2, 2 a) forcontrol by the machine control parameters in dependence on whichsignature it finds after decryption from a plurality of signatures. 7.Method of avoiding improper machine activation by machine controlparameters of a machine tool (2, 2 a), characterized in that the machinecontrol parameters intended for the machine tool are encoded by means ofan asymmetric encryption method with the aid of an encryption key whichis assigned to the machine tool and is provided for the encryption, sothat the machine tool can decode the machine control parameters againwith the aid of a decryption key which is likewise assigned to it, isdifferent from the encryption key and is provided for the decryption. 8.Method of avoiding improper machine activation by machine controlparameters of a machine tool (2, 2 a) according to claim 7,characterized in that a machine identification assigned to the machineis added to the machine control parameters before the encryption, sothat, when it decodes the machine control parameters again with the aidof its assigned private decryption key, the machine tool can determineon the basis of the fact that these contain the machine identificationassigned to it that the parameters concerned are machine control datafor its activation.
 9. Method of avoiding improper machine activation bymachine control parameters of a machine tool (2, 2 a) according to claim7, characterized in that the machine control parameters intended for themachine tool are first encoded by means of a private decryption key,assigned to the sender of the machine control parameters, and areprovided with a sender identification of this sender, and, signed by thesender in this way, are only encoded with the aid of the encryption keythat is assigned to the machine tool and known for the encryption. 10.Computer system (1) with at least one data processing unit and at leastone memory, characterized in that the data processing unit is set up inprogramming terms in such a way that it works on the basis of the methodaccording to claim
 7. 11. Computer program which has instructions whichare set up for carrying out the method according to claim
 7. 12.Computer program product which has a computer-readable medium withcomputer program coding means, with which, after loading the computerprogram, a computer is made by the program to carry out the methodaccording to claim
 7. 13. Computer program product which has a computerprogram on an electronic carrier signal, with which, after loading thecomputer program, a computer is made by the program to carry out themethod according to claim
 7. 14. Data carrier or electronic carriersignal (3) with machine control parameters for reading into a machinetool (2, 2 a), the machine tool being protected against improperactivation, and having an open-loop and/or closed-loop control devicefor the activation of machine functions, preferably machine axes (σ₁,σ₂); means for reading in machine control parameters for the open-loopand/or closed-loop control device from a data carrier or electroniccarrier signal (3); and an improper-activation safety module, preferablyan improper-activation safety software module, which decodes the machinecontrol parameters again that are intended for the machine toolcharacterized in that on the data carrier or the electronic carriersignal there are machine control parameters for the machine tool (2, 2a) which are encoded by means of an asymmetric encryption method withthe aid of an encryption key which is assigned to the machine tool andis provided for the encryption, so that the machine tool can decode themagain with the aid of a decryption key which is likewise assigned to it,is different from the encryption key and is provided for the decryption,and the data carrier or the electronic carrier signal (3) controls themachine tool (2, 2 a) by means of these machine control parametersduring reading-in or after reading-in after they have been decoded. 15.Data carrier or electronic carrier signal (3) with machine controlparameters according to claim 14, characterized in that on the datacarrier or the electronic carrier signal there is at least one machineidentification included in the encryption and assigned to the machinetool (2, 2 a), so that, when it decodes the machine control parametersagain with the aid of its assigned private decryption key, the machinetool can determine on the basis of the fact that these contain themachine identification assigned to it that the parameters concerned aremachine control data for its activation.
 16. Data carrier or electroniccarrier signal (3) with machine control parameters according to claim14, characterized in that on the data carrier or the electronic carriersignal there are machine control parameters for the machine tool (2, 2a) which are first encoded by means of a private encryption key,assigned to the sender of the machine control parameters, and areprovided with a sender identification of this sender, and, signed inthis way, are only encoded with the aid of the encryption key that isassigned to the machine tool and known for the encryption.
 17. A methodof generating machine control parameters for a machine tool (2, 2 a)protected against improper activation, and having an open-loop and/orclosed-loop control device for the activation of machine functions,preferably machine axes (σ₁, σ₂); means for reading in machine controlparameters for the open-loop and/or closed-loop control device from adata carrier or electronic carrier signal (3), and animproper-activation safety module, preferably an improper-activationsafety software module, which decodes the machine control parametersagain that are intended for the machine tool characterized in that atleast one data carrier or electronic carrier signal (3) with machinecontrol parameters according to claim 14 is generated.
 18. Computersystem (1) for generating machine control parameters for a machine tool(2, 2 a) protected against improper activation, and having an open-loopand/or dosed-loop control device for the activation of machinefunctions, preferably machine axes (σ₁, σ₂); means for reading inmachine control parameters for the open-loop and/or closed-loop controldevice from a data carrier or electronic carrier signal (3) and animproper-activation safety module, preferably an improper-activationsafety software module, which decodes the machine control parametersagain that are intended for the machine tool with at least one dataprocessing unit and at least one memory, characterized in that the dataprocessing unit is set up in programming terms in such a way that itgenerates at least one data carrier or an electronic carrier signal (3)with machine control parameters according to claim
 14. 19. Computersystem (1) according to claim 18 for generating machine controlparameters for the machine tool (2, 2 a) characterized in that thecomputer system (1) has a reader, preferably a chip card reader, whichis intended for receiving an encryption module, preferably a chip card,which has the encryption key, with the aid of which the computer systemencodes the machine control parameters, and furthermore an encodingmodule, preferably an encoding software module, is provided for encodingthe machine control parameters, the encryption module being set up insuch a way that only the encoding module can read out the encryption keyfrom the module.
 20. Computer program which has instructions which areset up for carrying out the method according to claim
 17. 21. Computerprogram product which has a computer-readable medium with computerprogram coding means, with which, after loading the computer program, acomputer is made by the program to carry out the method according toclaim
 17. 22. Computer program product which has a computer program onan electronic carrier signal, with which, after loading the computerprogram, a computer is made by the program to carry out the methodaccording to claim
 17. 23. Computer control system for avoiding impropermachine activation by machine control parameters for the machine tool(2, 2 a) with a computer system (1) according to claim 18 for generatingmachine control parameters.
 24. Computer control system for avoidingimproper machine activation by machine control parameters for themachine tool (2, 2 a) with a computer program according to claim
 20. 25.Computer control system for avoiding improper machine activation bymachine control parameters for the machine tool (2, 2 a) with a computerprogram product according to claim 21.